Abstract I present a short proof of the minmax theorem using the replicator dynamics.
Introduction
The minmax theorem of von Neumann [10] where X, Y are the unit simplices in R n , R m and U : X × Y → R is a continuous function, quasi-concave in x and quasi-convex in y. The proof was by induction on the number of variables, see also [7] . An important special case is where U is a bilinear function U (x, y) = x · Ay, with A an n × m matrix.
The idea to use dynamics for proving the minmax theorem (and computing the equilibria) goes back to Brown [1, 2] : for symmetric zero-sum games, i.e., A = −A T , he proved together with von Neumann [2] that the solutions of a certain differential equation converge to the set of equilibria. In [1] , he showed that the (continuous time) fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in any finite zero-sum game, which implies the minmax theorem for any n × m matrix A. Brown's fictitious play process [1] is now often framed as best response dynamics and can be used to prove the minmax theorem for more general payoff functions U , which are continuous and concave/convex, see [6] . For the original version [10] for continuous quasi-concave/quasi-convex functions, a dynamic proof is still missing. Another proof based on differential inclusions can be found in [8] .
In the present note, I give a short proof of the minmax theorem in the matrix case, based on the replicator dynamics. 
Replicator Dynamics
The replicator dynamics [5] for an n × m bimatrix game (A, B) is given bẏ
Here x i denotes the frequency of strategy i of player 1, hence x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is in the probability simplex n = {x ∈ [0, 1] n : x i = 1}, y j is the frequency of strategy j of player 2, y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ m , and e i denotes the ith unit vector.
Besides its original derivation from evolution and natural selection, there are at least two economic motivations based on imitation and on reinforcement learning.
For a zero-sum game B = −A T , in the interior of n × m we obtaiṅ
Now add these equationsẋ
and integrate
denote time averages of the solutions of (1, 2). Now consider limit points, i.e., choose a sequence
Multiplying by x i and y j and summing over i and j, we obtain 
Additionally, (3) or (4) also imply
so (x,ȳ) is a pair of optimal strategies for the zero-sum game. (In particular, this shows the existence of equilibria.)
Furthermore, if we integrate (1, 2) directly, then we obtain 0 ≥ e i · Aȳ −ā and 0 ≥ −x · Ae j +ā, withā = lim T →∞ 1 T T 0 x(t)Ay(t)dt, and hence e i · Aȳ ≤ā ≤x · Ae j ∀i, j.
Comparing with (6), we getā =x · Aȳ. Summarizing, besides minmax theorem (5), we have shown:
Theorem Every limit point (x,ȳ) of the time averages (x(T ),ȳ(T )) of positive solutions (x(t), y(t)) of the replicator dynamics is a pair of optimal strategies of the zero-sum game.
And the time averages of the payoffs
converge to the valuex · Aȳ of the game, as T → ∞.
Remarks

1.
If log x i (T ) and log y j (T ) are bounded functions of T (i.e., the solution stays at a positive distance from the boundary of n and m ), then we have equality in (3) for all i, j, and the existence of a fully mixed equilibrium follows. The converse holds as well, see [3, 5, 9] : If ( p, q) > 0 is an equilibrium of the zero-sum game, then the relative entropy
or Kullback-Leibler divergence is a constant of motion for (1, 2):Ḣ = 0. The replicator dynamics is even a Hamiltonian system w.r.t. a suitable symplectic or Poisson structure [3] , and hence, on each level set of H , by Poincaré's recurrence theorem, almost every solution is recurrent. The behavior of the solutions might be chaotic, but by the above theorem, their time averages approach the set of equilibria. 2. For nonzero-sum games, a similar argument shows that the time averages 1 T T 0 x i (t)y j (t)dt (i.e., how often does player 1 use strategy i against strategy j of player 2 in a given period) converge (as T → ∞) to the set of exact coarse correlated equilibria, see [4] . This holds also for N player normal form games.
